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The Economic Contribution and
World Influence of China’s Reform
and Development Governance
Zhao Hongjun & Gao Fan*
Abstract:

This article summarizes a series of valuable accomplishments of China’s
government in promoting economic development, reducing poverty,
maintaining social stability, and increasing people’s prosperity since 1949. It
summarizes the economic analysis framework of development governance in
mainstream economics, and further analyzes the connotations and extensions
of the conceptual framework. This paper also summarizes some of the core
economic characteristics embodied in China’s Reform and Development
Governance since the reform, and further explores the necessity and direction
of its future modernization and its impacts on different countries and regions
in the world.

Keywords: China’s development governance; reform and opening-up; economic contribution;
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Introduction

A

fter four decades of reform and opening-up, China’s economic growth
has achieved impressive results both on an aggregate and per capita basis.
However, research on the economic contributions and world influence of China’s
development governance, a major theoretical issue, has been far from enough. There
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are several reasons. First, compared with the global economy, the Chinese economy is still on a rapid-growth
track. Though economic slowdown has been the new normal to an extent since 2009, China’s moderate to
high-speed growth has not fundamentally reversed. Second, China’s present economic development model
is undergoing continuing adjustments, fast transitions and great changes, and will continue to do so in the
foreseeable future. Over the past 40 years, both the market and government have played important and
positive roles in facilitating economic development. As a result, economic researchers and policy-makers have
not reached consensus on major issues: What exactly is development governance with Chinese characteristics?
What are the core features of China’s development governance? How did and will these distinct aspects
influence China’s continuing economic development? Third, China’s fast-growing economy and the highly
flexible and positive role of a strong government on driving this process over the past four decades have
produced a range of challenges to neoclassical economic theories. ① Is China creating a fully new governance
model? ② Is there something unique about the economics of China’s reform and opening-up, or is it merely
the application and extension of Western economic theories in China? Economic theories regarding these
questions are being discussed, modified and repeatedly tested.
At a symposium on philosophy and social sciences held on May 17, 2016, President Xi Jinping pointed
out that, “The great change in today’s China is that we are not simply continuing the old pattern of Chinese
history and culture, nor simply copying the templates designed by authors of Marxist classics, or reproducing
other countries’ socialist practices, or replicating the modernization trajectories of foreign countries. There is
no textbook readily available. China’s philosophy and social sciences community should focus on what we are
doing. We should mine new materials, identify new questions, propose new ideas and construct new theories
based on China’s reform and development practices. We should systematically summarize the practices
and experiences of reform and opening-up and socialist modernization, work out rational new theories and
generalize effective new practices. This should be the direction and focus for shaping philosophy and social
sciences with Chinese characteristics. ”③ Also in the Report to the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi stated, “The
path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics is developing, blazing
a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries
and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers
Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.”④
We believe that President Xi’s speeches on this issue tell us that although China is still on a moderate to
high-speed growth track, its future development would be ill-positioned without forward-looking philosophies

① Xu Chenggang pointed out that the trajectory of China’s economic development posed a set of challenges to neoclassical economics. For example, China’s
understanding of the connotation and essence of institution and the relationship between institution and development is a big step ahead of that of neoclassical
economics. Regional decentralization is effective in addressing incentives to reform, which has not been adequately covered in neoclassical economics. Local
governments play an essential role, because of not only their powers, but also their ability to do so. Wen Yi argued that, mainstream economics, represented by
the Washington Consensus and the New Institutional Economics (NIE), was theoretically misleading and politically naive, primarily due to the fact that the
basic conditions required by a free market are extremely hard to meet in reality. These economic theories fail to take into due account the societal and political
environment required by market functioning and the role of government in industrialization.
② John & Doris Naisbitt, renowned futurists, are optimistic in their book China's Megatrends that the Chinese society is shaping a new social and governing
system different from those of the Western societies. The book has identified eight pillars, i.e., emancipation of the mind, balancing top-down and bottom-up,
framing the forest and letting the trees grow, crossing the river by feeling the stones, artistic and intellectual ferment, joining the world, freedom and fairness,
and from Olympic medals to Nobel prizes.
③ Xi, 2016, pp.21-22
④ Xi, 2017
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and social sciences (including economic theories) as guidance. In addition, despite the ongoing adjustments
and drastic changes in the Chinese economic model, it would be unreasonable if there were no good
summaries of the great practices and innovations since the reform and opening-up or without any explorations
of the predictions and guidance made by the economic theories rooted in China’s reality. Though economic
communities at home and abroad have not reached consensus on China’s economic development, reform and
governance, it is necessary to encourage theoretical structuring and discussions regarding China’s economic
development from the perspective of different economic theories.
In this context, this paper centers on four core questions: (1)What is the connotation and extension of
China’s development governance? (2) What has been the core elements and features of this governance
over the four decades of reform and opening-up? (3) Where is the necessity and direction of China’s future
modernization? (4) What are the possible implications for the world and boundaries of China’s development
governance and its contribution to world governance?

1. The connotation and extension of China’s Reform and Development
Governance
1.1 Connotation of China’s Reform and Development Governance
What is governance? The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee identified the
modernization of governmental governing capabilities and systems as part of the general objective of
comprehensively deepening reform. Since then, the term “governance” has gone far beyond its original
meaning and evolved into an inclusive concept. We believe that governance is not limited to politics,
management, and economics but refers in general to the aggregation of means, approaches, principles and
art of managing a country, region, city, business, public institution, even a household, be it an economic or
social organization. According to the different subject, it can be divided into political governance, corporate
governance, social governance, economic governance, governmental governance, environmental governance,
security governance, state governance, etc.
What is development governance? In light of relevant UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
World Bank development indicators,① studies on governance indicators and OECD research on governmental
governance indicators,② we believe “development governance” is a concept that well generalizes government
policies and practices to facilitate economic development, reduce poverty, maintain social stability and
enrich the people, among other aspects, since the founding of the PRC, particularly during the reform and
opening-up. The benefits of doing so is two-fold. This conceptual framework is in line with the efforts and
goals of promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, maintaining social stability and increasing people’s
well-being by countries as evaluated by international organizations including the World Bank. Under the
analytic framework of mainstream economics, the governance indicator is, to a large extent, an integrated
indicator for evaluating a country or government’s regulatory quality, rule of law, business climate and other
dimensions. Thus, development governance can be used to cover a variety of systems, measures and practices

① The World Bank, 2018
② Christiane Arndt et al. 2007
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in facilitating economic growth and reducing poverty, among other areas, since the founding of the PRC,
particularly the reform and opening-up. In this light, development governance, as defined in this paper, refers
to the aggregation of means, approaches, principles and art employed by a society to facilitate economic
development, reduce poverty, maintain social stability, narrow regional development gaps, and increase
people’s wealth.
Chinese Reform and Development Governance (CRDG), according to our understanding, can be
summed up as a range of experiences, lessons, means, approaches, principles and arts of the central and
local governments in playing a major role, through reform and institutional innovation, among other means,
in promoting economic development and prosperity of the market economy, reducing poverty, providing
infrastructure and public services, narrowing regional and urban-rural gaps, maintaining social stability,
increasing people’s income and improving their standard of living. Specifically, CRDG should contain the
following, i.e., how the Chinese government accomplishes the following basic development tasks through
emancipating institutional innovation: (1) What role should government play in economic development,
including providing infrastructure, reducing poverty, narrowing regional gaps, and increasing people’s
wealth? (2) What can government do in maintaining fairness, justice, rule of law, and social stability, including
offering public goods and services like national defense, public security, and clean environment? How does
government maintain social fairness and justice through the rule of law? How does government maintain
social order and stability? (3) government land, fiscal, tax and public policies regarding societal, economic
and institutional dimensions; (4) government policies and systems on talent selection and officials’ motivation
across society; (5) the relationship between the central and local governments; (6) government attitudes
and industrial policies on the agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors; (7) the relationships between
government, markets and society and the position and role of markets in resources allocation, etc.
1.2 Extension of China’s Reform and Development Governance
From the logic point of view, extension means the quantity and scope of objects covered by a concept. In
this light, we believe the extension of CRDG should at least cover the following three aspects:
(1) The experiences, lessons, means, approaches, principles and art of CRDG should cover the following
dimensions; promoting economic development, reducing poverty, providing infrastructure and public services,
maintaining social stability, narrowing regional gaps, and increasing national and people’s wealth in the
process of China moving from a less developed to developed and from traditional to modern. This means that
our experience, lessons, means, approaches and art in China’s Reform and Development Governance can draw
upon all useful components from the past and present, at home and abroad to serve China’s modernization.
(2) If seen from the domestic context only, the CRDG involves three major historical periods from
the less developed to the developed and from the traditional to the modern; development governance in the
agricultural era (221 B.C.― 1949), the planned industrial economy period (1949 ―1977) and following the
reform and opening-up (1978 to present). The first period, though fundamentally different from the others, laid
the foundation for development. The others are connected but essentially different, with the former being the
foundation of the latter, while the latter is an evolved and upgraded version of the former. ①
(3) In addition to its connections with Chinese history and reality, CRDG is also related to foreign
① Xi, 2018
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development governance. Chinese development governance had the experience and lessons of a closed
approach in history, then moved from a closed approach to an open one and benefited and learned from
the open approach to governance. A general objective of comprehensively deepening reforms set at the 3rd
Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee is the modernization of governmental governing capabilities
and systems. This dictates that the extended scope of CRDG is inevitably open, one that not only draws upon
advanced governance experience, but also shares successful stories with the international community to
influence more developing countries and even developed ones.

2. Core features of development governance since China’s reform and
opening-up
China’s Reform and Development Governance since the reform and opening-up is different from that
prior to 1949, or the fully planned approach from 1949 to 1977.① Its core features, lie in the following five
aspects:
(1) A strong government has progressively and structurally affected changes that favor a market
economy. There would be no Chinese economic miracle since reform and opening-up without the
transformation of the traditional strong government itself, ending discrimination of businessmen and stopped
industrial discrimination against commercial activities. Then how did a strong Chinese government pull
off such a shift? We believe the answer lies in an analysis of the Communist Party of China. In the age of a
traditional agricultural economy, a large number of intellectuals guided by Confucian doctrine had historically
been actors governing the country over dynasties and generations. However, without the leadership by a strong
political organization, intellectuals were often trapped or taken advantage of by various political, interest, or
merchant groups. This gave rise to various governance measures against the public interest, which in turn
led to revolts by the oppressed agricultural class, ruining economic development results. Thus, the era of the
traditional economy was mired in the “high-level equilibrium trap.”②
The CPC has, since its inception, fought for the benefits of the vast majority despite its ups and downs.
Adhering to political learning, the Party has guided itself with Marxist theories without being distracted
by Western theories or doctrines, guiding China’s practices with the Chinese version of Marxism. Also,
the Party successfully drew upon the merits of traditional governmental governance and preserved vitality
through championing the best interests of the wider public while keeping up pace with the times through
organizational and institutional innovations. Under the Party’s leadership, the Chinese government shifted
away from discrimination against business towards supporting and valuing businessmen. This change in
attitude contributed to the transformation and shift of China from the biggest agricultural economy into a “world
factory” over three to five decades, from hostility towards innovation and change to proactive institutional
innovation, from the originally closed approach to “reform forced by opening-up,” from fiscal centralization to
decentralization, and the government role from traditional “grabbing hand” to real “helping hand”. Driven by
these strong forces the Chinese economy started from scratch and pursued prosperity step by step.

① Zhao, 2016
② Yao, 2003

111

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.2. 2019

(2) Fiscal decentralization between the central and local governments, along with competition between
government officials, has made governments at all levels a major driver for economic development. One
important sign of the progressive and structural evolution of a strong government as discussed above is the
change of relationship between the central government and the local governments. At the core of such a
change is fiscal decentralization and the competition for promotion among government officials. In the age of
the traditional agricultural economy, centralization engulfed all, reducing local governments to mere affiliates
of the central government, so officials lacked the enthusiasm and initiative to drive reform and development.
However, under fiscal decentralization, the central and local governments cooperate for shared benefits rather
than compete on a win-lose basis. Motivation and compatibility replaced the zero-sum game. Further, at the
heart of this decentralization is the so-called promotion championship between officials, i.e., those who obey
the central and higher governments, actively accomplish tasks and outperform others would be promoted and
gain corresponding financial and political benefits, while those who did not excel might suffer both financially
and politically. Thus, local governments became a major driver for economic development. When local
economy grows, the fiscal decentralization system enables such growth to benefit both the local government
and the ruling officials. As a result, officials get promoted, local economies grow and the central government
realizes the best result.
(3) Vertical centralization plus horizontal fiscal federalism enables a good match of incentives and
restraints on governments. This is another sign of the evolution of strong government. Horizontal fiscal
federalism can motivate local governments’ enthusiasm for promoting development, but without vertical
centralization, local governments with good performance might often potentially challenge the status of
the central government. Vertical centralization primarily refers to moderate checks and controls on local
governments by the central government, including centralized appointments of important, high-ranking
officials, centralized and uniform policies and decrees, centralized operation of infrastructure such as
transport, telecommunications, national defense, water conservancy, etc., and central government ownership of
important resources, mainstay industries and state-owned enterprises. In this way, the incentive and restraint
and centralization and decentralization between the central and local governments are well coordinated. This
represents a core feature most important to China’s Reform and Development Governance since reform and
opening-up. China has learned bitter lessons in history. For example, the military governor system of the Tang
Dynasty ultimately developed separatism that threatened the central government. One key lesson is that as
the central authority was undermined to an extent and horizontal fiscal federalism was cut off due to remote
geographical locations, military governors evolved into military and economic entities over time that threaten
China’s political unification. ①
(4) Progressive economic and market-based reforms have contributed to the dynamic economic growth
over the past four decades. This is another narrative of the progressive and structural changes of a strong
government that benefit the economy. Without the essential and functional shift of a strong government, such
dynamic economic growth would be impossible. However, such progressive economic and market-oriented
① A closer look at the administrative division maps of Chinese dynasties would find that the interlocked administrative divisions of provinces and prefectures
are starkly different from those of Western countries. In fact, this is an “intentional design” for unified ruling summed up by rulers of many dynasties in
practice. Simply put, the interlocking of administrative regions geographically rules out military or political separatism by local governments, so as to facilitate
centralized, unified leadership by the central government.
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reforms were not achieved overnight, rather as a result of long-standing interactions between governments
and markets and through incremental trial and error. At first, the government could not accurately predict the
effects and market responses of policy shifts, so it launched pilots in selected provinces or cities. A summary
of experiences and lessons would follow such pilots. If the pilot programs saw good results without destructive
damage to the economy and society as a whole they would be scaled up in other regions. If results were not
good, the programs would be modified or discontinued. As positive results started to show, local governments
began to shift from a generally passive role towards active institutional innovation with tightened controls. A
typical case in point is the rural household contract responsibility system piloted in Xiaogang Village, Anhui
province.
(5) Opening-up-forced reform has been the greatest driver for China’s Reform and Development
Governance The reform and opening-up over the past 40 years was in a strict sense, opening-up reform,
or more accurately “reform forced by opening-up,” a basic logic floated at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CPC
Central Committee. Why? The reason lies in the fact that any reform would likely be very difficult in a
country like China with a 5,000-year civilization and long history. Reforms and political changes throughout
Chinese history mostly failed, primarily due to political opposition from vested interest groups. When China
closed its doors, it tended to hopelessly dwell on its past glory and prosperity. Conversely, when it opened to
the outside world, it could learn from other civilizations. Over the past four decades, by opening-up, China
has learned a vast amount about patent, property, and modern enterprise systems, joint stock systems, shares,
futures markets, WTO and free trade, Internet and e-commerce, judicial systems, human rights, modern rule
of law, etc. Accordingly, we reformed a range of old systems and eliminated many outdated systems, rules and
regulations, seniority, and life-time tenure that do not fit in with a modern market economy. Following the 3rd
Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee, China continued the “reform forced by opening-up” approach,
and learned from pilot free trade zones, market regulators, electronic business licenses, “one-stop processing
and parallel handling,” negative lists and even the general objective of modernization of governmental
governing capabilities and systems. All these prove that “reform forced by opening-up” has been the greatest
driver for China’s development governance.
However, it is worth noting that while China is now at the frontiers of world technology, knowledge
and productivity, it is necessary to adjust the logic underlying CRDG, i.e., reform forced by opening-up. At
this point, the drivers for development governance in the new era will be the charm of traditional Chinese
civilization, and innovations in human resources, science and technology, education, production and other
sectors.

3. The direction and world influence of the modernization of China’s Reform
and Development Governance
3.1 Necessity of China’s Reform and Development Governance
Since the late 1970s, China has shaped its distinctive development governance model which has been
a driver for China’s sustained dynamic economic growth. However, this model must remain flexible. As
economic and societal development levels, strategic goals and constraints change, we need to adjust our
development governance model to adapt to such changes.
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First, China’s strategic goals vary significantly by development stage. In the late 1970s, China launched
its economic system reform against the backdrop of pending economic collapse. Thus, driving high-speed
economic growth was a basic strategic goal of Chinese economic development from the 1970s to the early
21st Century. However, China has now become the second largest economy, following the U.S., in terms of
economic aggregate, with significantly increased income and consumption levels of its residents, which gave
rise to increasing needs in social, political, cultural, ecological and other dimensions. So, China needs to meet
new strategic goals at this stage by improving its development governance model.
Second, since the 1970s, China’s development governance model has triggered or exacerbated many
structural contradictions in the economic sector while driving high-speed economic growth. Particularly,
the decentralization reforms of the central and local governments led to local decentralized authoritarianism,
an institutional arrangement that stimulated competition on economic growth between local governments,
but also led to a relatively inadequate supply of livelihood-related public goods. Under this system, local
governments tended to drive economic growth by stimulating investment, which was a major cause of the
imbalanced demand structure, input structure and industrial structure in the current stage. In the context of
supply side structural reform, China must modernize its development governance structures to ensure gradual
optimization of its economic structures.
Third, China now develops its economy not in a closed environment, but in the context of further
globalization. Against the backdrop of economic globalization, flows of goods, capital, technology and
information, among other factors, between China and foreign economies, all of which are growing, it
is possible that foreign economic systems would affect the choice of China’s Reform and Development
Governance. Since the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis of the U.S. and the ensuing global financial crisis,
the U.S., Europe and Japan, among other economies, all have stepped up their economic transformations
and innovations. Such a shift in external environments is also forcing China to modernize its development
governance in response to domestic structural adjustments and international economic competition. Previous
effective development governance models do not guarantee desired future results. With changes in strategic
goals, constraints, and a constantly changing international landscape, China must focus on modernizing its
development governance to provide stronger institutional safeguards for sustained, coordinated economic
development.
3.2 Direction of modernization of China’s Reform and Development Governance
Modernizing China’s governing capabilities and systems is part of the general objective of
comprehensively deepening reforms. Based on relevant studies, we believe that the modernization of China’s
Reform and Development Governance should at least show the following tendencies:
(1) A strong government will exert its force on economic development more through indirect legislative,
fiscal and tax guidance than administrative, direct intervention. For example, environmental pollution is now
a serious problem in China. Countermeasures taken by both the central and local governments are mostly
administrative or directly intervening, such as the central government sending environmental supervisory
teams to places across China to monitor and inspect environmental protection; local governments directly
imposing administrative, disciplinary actions or fines against businesses or persons responsible for heavy
pollution; ceasing approval for investment and business operations in pollution-heavy industries; mandatory
relocation of such heavily polluting industries; subsidizing investments in green industries, etc. Such means
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of intervening in economic development depend more on administrative law enforcement by competent
government authorities, thus are very administrative, random and cyclical. The biggest flaw of such means is
that businesses often lack a stable, predictable and transparent institutional environment in relevant industrial
sectors. In addition, it would trigger corruption as businesses avoid or circumvent government interventions
and regulations. Going forward, government can no longer use such administrative, directly intervening
methods or means, but should rely more on guiding, indirect statutory, fiscal and tax schemes, policies and
measures. This means that to intervene in economic development, government must first formulate and amend
laws, hold social and business hearings, solicit opinions from communities, and pass legislative actions, before
effecting such inventions through strict law enforcement. Further, for businesses to enter environmentally
unfriendly industries, they must pay taxes at higher rates as required by law to and assume higher cost for
environmental protection. Doing so will prompt businesses to invest more in environmental protection
facilities and allow more time to turn to relevant green industries.
(2) China’s future development governance should clearly define the governing boundaries of the central
and local governments. Meanwhile, it needs to make clear the roles played by governments, markets and
society.① Prior to the reform and opening-up, the powers and expenditure boundaries between the central
and local governments were blurred. Local governments were simply local offices of the central government,
obeying central orders in economic and social governance with little incentive to drive development. After the
reform and opening-up, these governing boundaries were more clearly defined through fiscal decentralization.
Going ahead, the boundaries and scope of governance between the central and local governments must be
more clearly defined. For example, the Decision of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee
notes that, “We will increase the powers and expenditure responsibilities of the central government. National
defense, diplomacy, national security, and rules and administration of a national unified market will be
within the authority of the central government. The construction and maintenance of certain major projects
regarding social security and cross-regional affairs will be shared by the central and local governments, with
a view to gradually sorting out authority relationships. Regional public services will be within the authority
of local governments. The central and local governments should share expenditure responsibilities as per
division of powers. The central government may delegate certain powers and expenditure responsibilities to
local governments through arranging transfer payments. For cross-regional public services that substantially
affect other regions, the central government will share partial powers and expenditure responsibilities through
transfer payments.”②
In terms of the performance of the central and local governments, the Decision notes that, “We will
strengthen macro-control duties and capabilities of the central government and increase duties of local
governments in public services, market regulations, social governance and environmental protection.”③ It
can be expected that going forward, the boundaries delineating governments, markets and society will be
more clearly defined. For example, the Decision points out that “Economic system reform is a priority of
comprehensively deepening reforms. The core is properly handling government-market relationships to make

① Zhao, 2011, pp5-13;Planning Office, Research Division, SUIBE, 2014
② Reading Book Compilation Group, 2013, p.21
③ Reading Book Compilation Group, 2013, p.18
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market play a decisive role in allocation of resources...The functions and role of government mainly include
maintaining the stability of the macro-economy, increasing and bettering public services, guaranteeing social
equity, strengthening market supervision, maintaining market order, facilitating sustainable development,
promoting shared prosperity, and making up for market failures.”① In terms of government-society
relationships, the Decision also makes clear that, “We will step up the separation of government and social
organizations, enable social organizations to clearly define their full responsibilities, self-govern in accordance
with law and play their due roles. Public services better offered, and issues suitable to be addressed, by social
organizations should be left with social organizations.” This means that the governments will no longer be
both a provider and supervisor of public services. Instead, these two functions will be separated to provide
efficient public services and effective supervision over such services.
Further, the boundaries between governments, markets and society should be clearly defined. However,
it is worth noting that the three are not independent but are instead interactive and complementary in their
respective roles, constituting “integrated governance.”②
(3)In terms of models, future development governance will shift from management-based governance
to service-based. So far, we’ve seen three governing models throughout human history, i.e., ruling-based,
management-based and service-based models. Under the ruling-based governance model, government is the
unitary actor, while under the management-based governance model, both government and the markets have
their roles to play. Undoubtedly, in future China will adopt a service-based governance model under which
there are diverse actors engaged in governing, with governments, markets and society playing dominant roles.
Under such a model, government is just one of the actors in social and economic governance. Governments’
role will not be one-way management and control of markets and society, but to shape virtuous interactions
with them according to the willingness of market players and society and in light of the public interests and
security of the country in general. At the same time, such a shift in development governance and philosophy
also means that governments will listen to wider needs and opinions from markets, communities and the
general public in exercising its functions, designing administrative systems, and developing management
systems and policies. Moreover, in the institutional dimension, legal systems that favor the independent
development of society and markets need to be developed. Particularly, in the operational dimension, various
favorable policy should be developed for the autonomous development of society, including the shift from
functional transitions to process re-engineering, from internal operations to open functioning, and from
unitary governance to co-governance.③
(4) China’s Reform and Development Governance will focus more on capacity building in lawbased administration, standardized administration, efficient administration and system development. In
future, the macro-control and regulation by the Chinese government will still be indispensable and it will
regulate whichever local levels need to meet the requirements of a law-based, standardized and efficient
administration. This is an intrinsic requirement of the rule of law and an inherent need of the rule by law in
China’s governmental governance and state governance. For example, the current government functions shift

① Reading Book Compilation Group, 2013, p.5
② Tian & Chen, 2016
③ Zhao, 2018
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and institutional innovations at 11 pilot Free Trade Zones give special attention to law-based governance.
After all, as domestic and foreign businesses, organizations and economic activities compete on the same
playing field, economic actors within such Free Trade Zones will soon enter into, conduct transactions with,
and resolve disputes with other domestic and foreign market players. Therefore, government functional shifts
and institutional innovations at these Free Trade Zones must be law-based, international and standardized to
realize prior advice, process regulations and post reviews and punishments as required by law. Traditional
governing practices of cross-the-line interventions or backstage operations should no longer be allowed. “Lawbased” or “by law” governance reflects the awareness to handle matters in accordance with law; “standardized”
governance reflects the basic requirements for international and standardized practices; and “efficient”
governance reflects a fundamental feature of the era that matches an open economy and market economy.

4. The impact of China’s Reform and Development Governance on global
governance
In recent years, there have been growing calls for China to engage in global governance. A sober analysis,
however, would reveal that the most possible and positive role of China in global governance is more actively
engaging in development governance. Several reasons are as follows. First, given the broad connotation
and extension of global governance, China should determine its weaknesses and strengths in relevant areas,
rather than blindly take on responsibilities for which it is not competent. A closer look at China’s contribution
to governance over the past six decades would show that China probably has the most say on development
governance as discussed in this paper, as opposed to other areas of governance. Second, China is now still
on a fast-growing track with a relatively low overall standard of living and has yet to accomplish the basic
objective of establishing itself as a moderately developed country. So, China should all the more pursue
relatively positive yet conservative objectives for a majority of countries, i.e., reducing poverty, narrowing
local and regional gaps, and striving for a more prosperous nation and better well-being for its people. Third,
the identification of development governance as a major area for China to engage in global governance can
win support from international organizations, including the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and developing national
economies. That said, what exactly are China’s impacts on and contributions to global governance?
(1) China is an exemplary leader in driving the development and growth of the world economy. To most
countries today, economic growth remains a core priority. However, many national governments have yet to
work out good options for promoting economic growth. In this, China has a dual role to play. For one, China
itself as an engine for world economic growth can drive the global economy with its own development and
growth as a leader and pioneer; for another, China may share its good practices and ideas in development
governance with developing economies. For instance, China’s pilot-based policy can be implemented by
other countries; its progressive reforms and tiered extensions by region could be adopted by many developing
countries. Moreover, China’s reform and opening-up strategy from eastern to western regions and from
coastal to inland regions is also a good example.
(2) China’s Reform and Development Governance offers Chinese wisdom and solutions for global
governance. For example, China’s economic reform emphasis simple opening-up to the outside world and
seeks to balance domestic demands. The mixed ownership of Chinese characteristics does not simply support
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the state-owned sector, but also give room to the private economic sector. In terms of government-market
relationships, China does not adopt the neo-liberal market fundamentalism, nor fully rely on the traditional
Keynesian interventionism. Instead, government has played a major role in establishing market rules and
maintaining market order.① In addition, there are interactions between economic and political reforms. While
respecting its history, culture and tradition China has been able to properly learn advanced governing practices
from developed Western countries and chosen a pragmatic path that complements its reality. Politically, China
“sticks to socialism with Chinese characteristics and a multi-party cooperation system led by the CPC. On this
basis, China has managed to establish a sound basic rule of law and national systems, improved government
efficiency and governing capabilities, and be highly responsible in managing domestic affairs and exerting
macro-control in the economic sector.”② The valuable lessons for the benefit of global governance China has
offered include: There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the development of a country, let alone only freedom,
democracy and general elections as the only way as Western countries have preached. On the contrary, it is
very likely that there are other paths towards development other than the Western model. China’s development
path “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while
preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems
facing mankind.”③
(3) The wisdom of China’s Reform and Development Governance is turning China from a follower
into a leader of world system.④ This wisdom has not only presented the world with a China that attends to
itself, is increasingly economically developed and rising peacefully, but has gradually pushed China from
the fringe of the global system to the center of global governance. Here are a few examples: In 2001, China
was finally admitted to the WTO after 13 years of arduous negotiations. With undertakings made in multiple
aspects, China started its rapid integration into the world system. During the past 17 years, China has become
a staunch supporter and defender of free trade. It is the same with the World Bank and IMF, where China
has been moving from the periphery to the center, exerting influence and even driving organizational and
institutional reforms at the two organizations. As for the BRICS countries, China is gaining more international
support and increasingly being noted as an example of a developing country that is a builder and promoter of
the new international economic and political order. Over recent years, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund and Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) have gained increasing popularity, support and positive responses from a growing number
of international organizations and countries. All these signs show that China must acquire, adapt to and
gradually develop the competence and quality of a future world leader. China needs to strengthen its bonds
with other countries at the level of shared interests, which is the most fundamental and essential prerequisite.
Meanwhile, China needs to lean more on its moral charisma and appeal of its values. After all, “In an era
where wars between big powers are increasingly unlikely, international political mobilization and cohesion is
based more on identification of values and strategic mutual trust than interests.”⑤

①
②
③
④
⑤

Xin, 2016, p.22
Xin, 2016, p.34.
Xi, 2017, pp.5-8
Tian & Chen, 2016
Tian & Chen, 2016, p.226
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(4) In terms of the world influence of China’s Reform and Development Governance, it currently
concentrates primarily on developing economies in the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America, with increasing
influence on the wider world. A major reason lies in the fact that Asian, African and Latin American
economies are facing the same basic task as China, i.e. development and governance. Compared with these
countries, China has learned considerable practical lessons with its “pioneer and pilot” efforts in reform
and opening-up, and valuable governing experience in economic development and social stability. Also, as
the biggest developing country, China has strong political and cultural connections with wider developing
countries. However, as China-led BRI and AIIB expand their influence worldwide, SCO has greater sway
in the security sector, China’s shares in the World Bank and IMF grow, and the Confucius Institute spreads
its footprints across the world, China is seeing its development governance influence the wider world
including Europe and the Americas. For example, at present the Middle East and eastern European countries
urgently need Chinese investments and trade and have something to learn from China’s governance models
and approaches. Likewise, many African countries are eager to learn from and introduce China’s reformdevelopment-governance approach and models. All these indicate that China’s Reform and Development
Governance is seeing greater contributions to economics and growing in its world influence.
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